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lag in terms of attracting private sector investments, at least outside of narrow resource-based enclaves.
These countries may have recognized potential but
have not yet established the reputation needed to sustain investment through the inevitable political and policy shocks that take place in most countries.
The concerns that deter investors are many but can be broadly classified into high costs that that prevent global competitiveness and high actual or perceived risks.
Political and credit risk guarantees are often used to encourage investors but they cover only a narrow range of risks and are often issued on a deal-by-deal basis. This paper explores the possibility of expanding the range of guarantee instruments to encompass a wider range of risks and to integrate guarantees more centrally into the reform and investment programs supported by donors. The proposed approach is to offer firms Service Performance Guarantees (SPGs) --the opportunity to purchase insurance against a wider range of risks and through this to strengthen the accountability of both governments and development partners to their clients -in this case the firms. While it may not be practical to fully cover business losses, firms would receive highly visible payouts if service delivery standards fall short of those expected from the program.
Countries competing globally for investors are much like shopping malls that compete to attract tenants --they need to offer an attractive "service package".
This draws attention to the range of services the firms will consider when evaluating investment destinations. The proposal considers whether and how the promise of such a package could be made more credible through a guarantee instrument that could be integrated into reform or investment programs, for example to establish special economic zones. The approach may not be attractive to countries with a well-established reputation and may not be feasible for fragile states that lack the capacity to sustain the most basic conditions for business. It also would require a careful and realistic assessment of the authority of the agency issuing the guarantee, to ensure that it covers risks that are potentially under its control. SPGs can be seen as an extension of the results-based approach to make governments directly accountable to investors.
Introduction
Over the last few decades a number of developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, Many other developing countries have made progress in political openness and economic management but lag in terms of attracting private sector investments, at least outside of narrow resource-based enclaves. These countries may have recognized potential but have not yet established the reputation needed to sustain investment through the inevitable political and policy shocks that take place in most countries. The concerns that deter investors are many but can be broadly classified into high costs that that prevent global competitiveness and high actual or perceived risks. Donors and IFIs have many programs with these countries directed towards strengthening their policy frameworks and improving business climates as well as activities aiming to directly support private investment and diversify economies. These include, for example, infrastructure programs to build or rehabilitate power supply or ports, special economic zones, growth poles or other area-based projects to provide a better local package of services, trade facilitation programs to speed up border clearances, matching grant schemes to encourage firms to invest in new technologies or markets, supplier linkage programs and syndicated investments. To help firms mitigate risk, they also offer political risk and credit guarantees. Trade finance guarantee programs have escalated also, in the aftermath of the global crisis which saw the demise of prominent private insurers. This paper explores the possibility of expanding the range of guarantee instruments to encompass a wider range of non-commercial risks and to integrate guarantees more centrally into the reform and investment programs supported by the donors. The proposed approach is to offer firms Service Performance Guarantees (SPGs) --the opportunity to purchase insurance against a wider range of risks and through this to strengthen the accountability of both governments and development partners to their clients -in this case the firms --by triggering highly visible payouts when service delivery standards fall short of those expected from the program. 1 SPGs restructure accountability, away from donor-government commitments and towards the clients. Even with "results-based" approaches donors and countries can walk away from non-performing projects leaving disappointed investors. The "investments" may have been made and the policies may have been "reformed", satisfying the formal needs of countrydonor accountability. But this does not ensure that the clearance times for exports or imported inputs are actually cut, that VAT rebates on inputs into exports are processed speedily, or that power is delivered with fewer outages. And even if the project or program is results-based in the sense that the donor does not pay the country unless the results are delivered, this does not compensate the firms hurt by its failure to deliver the services.
SPGs can therefore be seen as an extension of the results-based approach.
Section 2 considers evidence on the business climate as seen by investors. Although the discussion focuses on Africa, the issues are relevant for a number of struggling countries in other regions. It also briefly reviews the nature and scope of guarantee instruments offered by a number of multilateral and bilateral development agencies. While these cover a limited set of risks, it notes that the framing of guarantees as insurance against contractual failures allows for a wider range of risks to be covered, including of the type envisioned for SPGs.
Section 3 develops the "shopping mall" analogy -a country is viewed as similar to a mall operator trying to attract tenants for its available facilities. The limited research on the economics of shopping malls suggests that astute operators structure contracts so as to attract tenants with the greatest externalities and that the closer the operator can come to providing an "all-in" service package the more likely is the mall or the country to be able to acquire a reputation as a prime investment location. Malls offer commitments to their client firms, and defaulting on these can prove very costly to the owner and operator. Hotels may also offer guarantees to both individual clients and other firms to build reputation for providing high-quality facilities.
Section 4 describes other types of guarantees relevant to the SPG concept: citizen charters and service guarantees and user compensation offered by utility companies. These reinforce several lessons: success requires having quantifiable indicators, minimal transactions costs, 3 and involved users and citizens who understand the guarantees or charters. Except for very large clients for whom individualized contracts are feasible, compensation should be automatic rather than requiring the submission of claims. We also briefly consider the distinction between payment in recognition of (and a deterrent to) poor service, and business loss insurance which is not practical on a wide scale.
Section 5 draws on these examples to consider the implications for the design of SPGs by developing countries as a part of a reform package or focused development project. SPGs could be included as components of donor-supported operations to strengthen the business climate. This raises many questions. What types of service delivery can be captured in quantifiable indicators? Who should underwrite the guarantees? Should payment be automatic or discretionary? How to limit moral hazard, including by firms seeking to game the system? Can new technology be used to expand the scope of guarantees by providing real-time monitoring information? And finally, what might be some implementation challenges for SPGs? Section 6 concludes, recognizing that more work would need to be done before SPGs could become operational.
Easing Constraints on Private Investors in Africa

The Business Climate
Investment climates in many African countries leave a lot to be desired. While countries differ in many ways, assessments (ICAs) often note the limitations of small markets, poor security and macroeconomic or policy instability. They typically flag the high costs and idiosyncratic risks resulting from poorly functioning infrastructure, as well as institutions that provide services to business. Business climate assessments have diagnosed these problems for a number of years and provided objective measures of some problems as well as reporting investors' subjective assessments of the importance of different barriers to business. The former include the Doing Business indicators and quantitative estimates of the high costs of unpredictable power outages 2 as well as of high indirect costs that reduce the profitability of firms that could otherwise be quite competitive at factory-floor level 3 .
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Subjective assessments often point in particular to poor power supply, macroeconomic instability and poorly functioning services, in some cases due to endemic corruption. 4 Figures 1a, 1b and 1c demonstrate some of the burdens imposed upon firms by a poor business climate. 5 Most of these problems are of long standing. Despite gains in the area of macroeconomic management and wider space for markets and the private sector, improvements in the investment climate have often been slow. Although a few countries, like Rwanda, show that quite rapid gains are possible, improvements in Doing Business indicators, for example, are heavily concentrated in a few areas, with very little progress in others, especially those involving the legal system (Gelb et al. forthcoming) . While some of the problems do requite large investments to fix, many others do not result from an absence of physical capital but rather reflect perverse incentives (Cantens et al 2010) .
How strong are the incentives to improve the business climate? Perhaps they are not as strong as they should be. Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran (2008) and Gelb, Meyer, and Ramachandran (2014) point to the possibility of a low-level business equilibrium which is stable or only slowly-changing, and in which governments, donors and firms see limited benefits from vigorously pursuing the investment-climate-related reform agenda.
Governments formally endorse the pro-business growth agenda and usually include reformminded policymakers with genuine commitment. But they also confront a range of bureaucratic interests that seek to maintain a rent-seeking system. Many countries have little capacity to track progress in outcomes and the implementation of key policy measures; and planning capabilities are weak even in many well-managed countries, such as Ghana and Tanzania. 6 In some cases, such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, the driving force for change has been pressure from the top rather than an institutionalized pressure from the electorate.
Not all heads of state are able to generate such pressure and there may be few actual incentives to encourage performance. In Zambia, for example, a major constraint on the continuity of reform effort has been the politicization of key civil service positions and their rapid turnover. This example suggests the need for continued vigilance to ensure that programs deliver their intended results and to understand the motivations of those on the ground.
Donors
Firms should be the pressure group that advocates for more efficient services. They are well-aware of shortcomings in the business climate and will benefit collectively from a more open and efficient playing field. Business surveys find that if "external costs" were reduced to the levels prevailing in other countries, the impact could be the equivalent of 50% of the wage bill. 7 But at the same time research on the structure of African industry suggests that these pressures may be muted. Many sectors are dominated by a few large and capable firms, shielded from entry and potential competition by the difficulties of the business climate. 8 This reduces their incentives to actively lobby for improvements. The situation is not helped by the high domestic market concentration of larger firms; open entry will cause them to lose this monopoly power. In addition, many successful firms belong to family or ethnically-8 related networks and the network advantages of such arrangements increase the weaker is the business climate for all firms. Networks and ethnically-based business groups and associations make it more difficult to build trust that is needed for business to present a unified face to government rather than pursuing individual interests. 9
The Scope of Guarantees
Guarantees are currently offered by a number of bilateral and multilateral institutions, including OPIC, CDC, PROPARCO, MIGA, IFC and the AfDB. The fact that these agencies are affiliated with powerful bilaterals or multilateral agencies may provide an additional source of comfort to investors. Table 1 provides indications of the size of their activities and portfolios. At first sight the volume of guarantees is impressive --in FY13, the seven organizations issued some $11.5 billion in guarantees. However, a closer look reveals a more nuanced picture. Programs to support trade finance in the aftermath of the global crisis account for around $7 billion. Part of the remainder involves partial credit guarantees, which insure against private risks. In total, programs to offer insurance against political risk (PRGs), the type of guarantee closest to the proposed approach of SPGs, total only some $3 -3.5 billion, with the largest concentration being in MIGA.
MIGA covers about 50 projects per year, issuing about $2.5 billion in guarantees. In 2012, 17 of these projects were in Africa, mostly to firms in the infrastructure and service sectors; only 4 projects provided coverage directly to manufacturing or agribusiness. While investments in these sectors may benefit from guarantees made to other investments (for example, a PRG on a power purchase agreement that brings in private investors), these data do not suggest that industry or agriculture are major direct clients for guarantees.
PRGs cover a standard set of risks that typically include currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction, expropriation, war, terrorism, and civil disturbance, breach of contract, and the non-honoring of financial obligations. However, the agencies can cover a wider set of risks of concern to investors provided that they can be expressed in terms of a breach of contractual obligations. For example, from MIGA: 
Countries as Shopping Malls or Investor Hotels
Shopping malls and hotels offer a useful perspective on competition for investors on the global capital market. A reputation for "all in" service quality has long been a central concern of market-based service firms and they sometimes use guarantees as a mechanism of conveying their clear commitment to servicing their clients. Guarantees can also serve as promotional tools. They may take the form of a promise to provide compensation that may not always be legally binding but will impact adversely on reputation if not carried through: Shopping malls face strong incentives to price their services efficiently and to deliver them as promised. Studies show that they value tenants according to the externalities they are expected to generate. Large "anchor tenants" able to attract people to the mall are likely to receive preferential treatment, in terms of lower rental per square foot, relative to small "mom and pop" stores.
Service quality and the reputation of the management are central for the ability of mall proprietors to continue in business. Failure to provide the full package of specified services such as security, cleanliness and snow removal from the parking lot can give tenants a valid reason to terminate their leases -the terms of the lease embody the contractual obligations of the mall operator. These will be standardized for smaller shops, but the far more complex custom leases of the major anchor tenants will include particular service agreements and remedies. Poor service delivery is very risky for an operator. Much like a country experiencing investor flight, once space is vacated and reputation damaged it is hard to secure new tenants capable of generating the externalities needed to attract others. High vacancy levels, in turn, raise property insurance costs; premiums typically double for property left vacant and subject to larger risks of damage from vandalism or un-noticed roof or plumbing failures.
Guarantees issued by hotels can stress their commitment to process efficiency --to keep check-in time down to a specified maximum such as five minutes or the time for the delivery of an item to a room to less than one hour. Another type of service guarantee -for example to a tour booking company that channels affluent clients to the hotel --could be to specify the minimum level of quality and variety to be maintained in the hotel's wine cellar.
Lessons from Shopping Malls and Hotels. Measures used by malls and hotels to boost their reputation offer some lessons for SPGs. They work best when there is a clear standard for a service and are more credible if they involve monetary compensation. They can serve as a signal to customers of devotion to quality, and their signaling effects are greater for lower-quality providers than for those whose quality is already well known. They are also 12 found to reduce customers' perceived risk. 11 It is not clear from the existing literature whether they have actually improved performance; they have improved quality as perceived by the clients but few studies have focused on the impact on actual service quality and innovation in delivery.
Another lesson is the importance of standardized agreements. General service guarantees are distinct from the customized service-level agreements that malls or hotels may make with critical clients. The former tend to be standardized and usually contained within the details of the lease; the latter are closely framed legally binding contracts often running to hundreds of pages and setting out obligations and remedies in great detail. Since the transactions costs of setting them up are high, they will be offered only to particularly important clients with individualized needs.
Citizen Charters and Utility Performance Guarantees
Under a Citizen's Charter, a government guarantees a certain level of service to customers; these can be citizens but also in some cases firms. They offer useful operational lessons for the design of SPGs. HMSO (1991) , as quoted by Mullen (2006) .
Charters in the United
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The concept of Citizen's Charters has since been adopted and modified by many nations including Belgium (1992), France (1992) , Spain (1992) , Malaysia (1993 ), Portugal (1993 ), Canada (1995 , Australia (1997), and India (1997) .
Energy offers an example. Distribution is split between 14 Distribution Network Operator
Companies and 6 Independent Distribution Network Operators. Almost 29 million domestic households are covered by these services. In the 1989 Electricity Act, the UK made mention of distributor service guarantees, though it did not make them universal at the time.
The 1993 The majority of payments were for delays in restoring power. 14
Charters in Australia
In the early 1990s, Australia mandated that a service charter be written and be made freely available by all government agencies, as well as certain industries. 15 The Consumer Guarantees Recent changes have also included the removal of inter-state energy trade barriers and public energy monopolies. However, the energy industry remains highly regulated; most standards are set by the states including for minimum supply and acceptable levels of customer service that must be met by distributors.
The Guaranteed Service Levels (GSLs) in all Australian states set the standards and payout levels that must be met by all electricity companies. These can vary vastly in terms of customer coverage, exceptions, and methods of payment. For example, Victoria operates its GSLs on a financial year basis, requires that payments from retailers to customers be automatic, and has incremental guarantee levels (based on the total number of times or number of hours an event occurs). Western Australia, on the other hand, covers fewer standards overall, requires that customers apply to retailers for compensation under for four of its five standards, and has lower payout guarantees than Victoria 21 (see Appendix B.1-B.6). Despite the conflicting nature of these statements, there is evidence 25 that customers have been compensated for broken appliances resulting from unplanned power outages, as well as in a few other instances. The specifics remain unclear relative to the Australian government's qualifications of "detriment," and actual compensation payouts are not disclosed.
In cases of customer-retailer or customer-distributor conflicts, all states have an Energy and Water Ombudsman scheme which serves as a faster alternative to formal legal processes.
Case handling requires that a consumer first attempt to contact his/her distributor or retailer directly before the EDR assists them to contact higher-level personnel. If these options do not work, the Ombudsman will open an investigation. The office of the Energy Ombudsman is financed by industry members (retailers, distributors, etc) who pay a yearly membership fee. They must also compensate the Ombudsman for costs incurred from handling consumer complaints. Reimbursements are for individual cases or are split according to members' share of cases.
Ombudsmen services are free for consumers. Despite the existence of the Ombudsman, only 8% of complaints 26 in 2012-2013 were made about customer service, and less than 2% were about supply issues. Most disputes are related to billing (54%) and customers' ability to pay. While the GSL scheme is available to customers that consume less than 100 MWh per year (usually individual households and small businesses), there is no clear scheme of compensation for losses incurred by larger businesses and manufacturers. All customers have the right to make a claim to their distributor; the result appears to be largely dependent 22 Fuel for a diesel-powered generator may thus be covered by this liability clause but the losses from an interruption in the activities of a business without a generator would not be covered unless the interruption was due to some negligence or wrongful action on the part of the distributor. The finer points of this, however, would probably need to be debated before a court of law. For a breakdown of GSL payments and energy consumption in one of the Australian states (Victoria), refer to Appendix C.1-C.4. Fees can also be a disincentive. While citizens can make complaints freely, both applications and access to information carry fees in the RTI system (for details, see Appendix D.2). In the past, states have modified these fees and often increased them which has raised concerns 31 Ibid. 18. 32 For example, the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board mandates that new water connections be sanctioned or denied within thirty working days. If the time is exceeded, a compensation of Rs. 20/-($0.33) is to be paid. If the decision is still not made fifteen days later, the consumer will get an additional Rs. 20/-($0.33) and a personal explanation from the managing director. 8 weeks after asking for water, a consumer could still not have the permission to connect, and only have been compensated Rs. 40/-($0.66) (values converted from INR to USD using rates from June 26, 2014). 33 With the exception of matters of public welfare/safety, which can remain private up to 20 years after the case has been closed. Political parties do not come under the RTI Act as judged by a parliamentary committee in December 2013. 34 The Central Government now has an online portal to facilitate request submission for citizens, in addition to physical submission as most state governments still do. There is also a growing business to have third-parties file RTIs on behalf of citizens for an extra fee. Just 1.6% was aware of the appeal mechanisms, and no one knew that compensation could be claimed from officers or the First Appellate Authority if they had failed to perform their duties. 39 35 It is believed by the government that the transparency of such deadlines will also reduce corruption amongst officials and citizens since the service must be delivered no matter what. However, Nick Robinson notes that services have actually slowed since, and that corruption may still occur to influence transaction speed (though not the final product).
Citizen Charters in India
36 Swagata Raha, "State Legislation on Right to Time-Bound Delivery of Service," Accountability Initiative Policy Briefs (2012), 11.
37 Nick Robinson, "Right to Public Service Acts in India: The Experience from Bihar and Madhya Pradesh," Accountability Initiative Policy Briefs (2012), 7-8. 38 From the 2011 Census. The interviews were also conducted around that time.
B Muralidharan, Evaluation and Management Audit of the Madhya Pradesh Lok
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The length and complicated nature of the process of compensation may also contribute to low utilization. In all states the First Appellate Authority has a conflict resolution timeframe that is either a) not mentioned, or b) 30 to 45 days. Filing a complaint may be complicated by existing policies, 40 the training and helpfulness of staff, and the accessibility of complaintprocessing bureaus (number, location/geographic spread, languages, spoken, etc.). The opportunity cost of filing a complaint may therefore be too high to actually follow through.
The coverage of most acts only guarantees unreasonable delays in services (a subjective assessment), with fine levels that, in some cases, can be very low. 41 Jammu and Kashmir is the only state to fine officers for poor quality of service. Officials have raised concerns that the imposition of time limits on service delivery may actually lower the quality of services.
Performance Contracts in the USA
In 1993 40 A single-window policy for example requires that all forms can be picked up, filled out, and submitted in one location. Madhya Pradesh does not have this explicit policy, but Bihar does. There are similar differences amongst all states that have enacted a Public Service Act. 41 Delhi, for example, only covers the delay in service provision by Rs. 10/-($0.17) per day, capped at RS. 200/-($3.32) per application. It is unlikely that a user would go through a bureaucratic process of several months to obtain the compensation (it is not provided automatically). The fee is probably not high enough to actually have an effect on officers and the process overall. 42 The recent scandal over falsified performance data by the Veteran's Affairs department suggests however that all service claims deserve both greater scrutiny and more effective citizen feedback mechanisms. See for example http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/the-va-s-scandal-just-keeps-spreading-20140714.
provision of utilities, with the notable exception of PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp owns two energy distributors that service parts of California, Washington, and Oregon (Pacific Power), as well as Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming (Rocky Mountain Power). The company voluntarily sets standards and has established compensation payments if it fails to meet these standards (see Appendix E.1). Most payments are automatic and are credited to the customer's account, ensuring on-going loyalty from consumers. 43 (For details, see Appendix E.2).
Lessons from Citizen Charters
The experience of citizen charters offers a number of lessons for potential SPGs, some of which parallel the lessons from shopping malls and hotels. Guarantees should be established on the basis of clear and quantifiable standards. The latter must be appropriate for each context; those too harsh will not enable the party providing the service to comply; those too lax will neither inspire trust by the client nor be utilized. Programs involving multiple small clients --individuals and SMEs --will benefit from automatic and public compensation systems because the transactions costs for case by case decisions will be too high to make claiming worthwhile. In most cases, insurance cannot therefore be offered to cover compensate for actual losses because these require detailed computations. The situation is different for large clients, and could involve more of a case-by-case approach.
For most clients, automatic compensation payments against quantifiable standards may therefore be more useful than discretionary processes or ones that require the filing of claims. They also protect claimants from having to reckon with intimidation and retribution by the service provider. If they work well, the public disclosure of performance through the guarantee or charter program can play an important role in helping citizens (in the aggregate) hold their service providers and governments to account. However, guarantees cannot be used as instruments of accountability unless clients are fully aware of their rights and of the mechanisms through which they can be compensated. 43 The Australian system allows consumers to decide on their method of payment, from account credit to personal checks. Though most guarantees cover distributors, which are regional monopolies, this nonetheless allows a client to switch to a different retailer and keep its compensation payment while doing so. PacifiCorp does not make this possible.
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Towards Service Performance Guarantees as Development Tools
Elements of an SPG
Can citizen charters and the experience of shopping malls and hotels inform the design of SPGs to attract investors? Just as hotels or shopping centers must compete for clients, countries must compete for investors especially for footloose industries not closely tied to a strong natural resource base. Countries, or investor zones within countries, can therefore be thought of as investor hotels. Some have particular assets, such as location, low-wage labor or natural resources but these may not be enough to ensure a healthy interest from a wide range of investors unless the country or zone is able to offer services (including security services) up to a minimum acceptable standard. Like shopping malls, countries may also try to attract and retain a few high-quality "anchor" investors able to deliver externalities and enhance its reputation; Costa Rica's courting of Intel to gain the attention of investors is an example. 44 These anchor investors will, of course, require individual attention but that is less practical for large numbers of smaller firms.
SPGs would combine elements of service guarantees, including of the type included in contracts, citizens' charters and insurance. If a wide range of services is to be covered, it is probably more practical to start in a particular economic zone. Both domestic and foreign firms would be eligible for the program, and be offered the opportunity to purchase a contract guaranteeing the delivery of specified services up to minimum standards for a prescribed period, possibly around 10 years. If offered in a zone, the contract could be embedded in the rental agreement for the premises or land. Drawing on the lessons above, contracts would be standardized rather than customized, except for the largest firms.
Although a form of insurance, SPGs cannot be implemented on an individual basis like political-risk and credit guarantees. The transactions costs would be prohibitive because they would need to insure large numbers of firms and provide payments to cover lapses in service performance that could be recurring and relatively small.
The guarantee could potentially cover a range of services. It could include, for example, the speed of processing of duty drawbacks and VAT rebates as well as other formalities, inspections and permits, the time needed for port turn-around and customs clearance at 44 Larrain, Lopez-Calva and Rodriguez-Clare 2000.
22 ports or airports. In certain conditions it could be feasible to cover the quality and reliability of power supply. The guarantees would be contractual legal agreements between the service provider --probably the operator of the zone --and the firm.
The SPG contracts would be covered by a "domestic reserve" funded from premiums paid in by the firms, perhaps as part of their lease agreements. This would be backed up by a further guarantee issued by an agency like MIGA or by USAID's Development Credit Authority which already has authority to issue guarantees to domestic, as well as foreign investors. The backup guarantee could also be issued by IDA or by another donor. These backup guarantees could be components of loans or development credits extended to the country to create or rehabilitate infrastructure, to help streamline business processes, or to establish an economic zone or a "growth pole". An "external reserve" would be set aside out of the loan amounts to cover the backup guarantee.
Calls on the performance contracts that exceeded the domestic reserve of the SPG would trigger calls on the external reserve and a payment from the development agency to cover the balance of the SPG. At the end of the prescribed period, any unused balances in the domestic and external reserve funds could revert to the country as a performance bonus for providing good services.
Towards Making SPGs Operational
The SPG approach aims to strengthen incentives for delivering results and can be seen as a variant of Results Based Aid. At the same time, however, it aims to provide firms insurance against inadequate delivery of key services, and to ensure that shortfalls in delivery are measured, reported, and raised to a high political level.
The first stage would be to understand the most serious impediments to investment. Some of these, like macroeconomic instability, might be out of the range of consideration but others, in the area of public services, might be within the scope of a potential project and able to be benchmarked against international norms. There may already be projects addressing these areas: these could be pulled together under an umbrella private sector development program, which would aim for an agreed set of performance standards, together with systems for monitoring performance. It might be more practical to pull the service standards together within a particular economic zone that already would have a management structure.
Firms, in the first instance, perhaps within such a zone, would be offered the opportunity to purchase a contract providing insurance against service lapses. To avoid an incentive for providers to prioritize particular firms, it might be better to insure against zone-wide performance rather than the services provided to an individual firm. This could simplify monitoring; it would certainly simplify reporting.
Compensation to a firm could be subject to two ceilings, one related to the level of insurance purchased and the other to the volume of investment or sales or exports. This is to ensure that firms are not just able to profit by betting on the performance of the zone operator. It is also necessary to ensure that the reserve fund is able to cover a suitably large number of firms. Compensation would be in recognition of poor service; it would not be practical to offer contracts that covered business losses.
Monitoring would be on a monthly basis, be part of the performance agreement between government and the responsible ministry responsible for the project and be reviewed by a tripartite commission representing government, investors and the donor. Lapses in performance beyond specified levels would trigger automatic compensatory payments to covered firms; if in a special zone they could initially be in the form of rebates on rents and other service charges. Depending on the contract, extremely poor service delivery could cause payments to exceed fees requiring access to the reserve fund. The total liability of that fund would need to be capped at some level and a limit set on the term of the guarantee program, for example, ten years. The resources for the reserve fund would come out of the allocation of assistance to the country, perhaps as a supplement to the business development operation.
Could SPGs Actually Work? Benefits and Risks
As a complement to an ongoing PSD/infrastructure program, the proposed operation offers several potential benefits. First, it would add credibility to the program and serve as a marketing tool for the country. Without "picking winners" it could play some role in encouraging investors, especially in export-oriented activities. Second, by forcing a focus on service delivery results it would provide a framework for investment and building capacity that emphasizes setting standards and monitoring results. Third, and perhaps most important, it would escalate policy dialog and reform in the investment climate area. Serious performance lapses would be treated as a breach of contract. The approach would restructure accountability, placing real accountability on the country authorities and donors who jointly support the program.
Having said this, one also needs to consider the difficulties and risks. The first risk is that of over-complexity. The approach will only work if the performance contracts are reasonably simple and easy to monitor. It might be easiest to pilot in enclave areas, particularly industrial zones, where infrastructure and enabling conditions (e.g. one stop shops) are in place for service delivery. In this kind of setting, the zone operator is typically already offering a package of infrastructure, public services, and streamlined regulation. An SPG could be more easily placed on top of that package, and if effective, could perhaps be oriented towards some of the export-oriented light manufacturing that still proves elusive to most African countries. The World Bank currently has a number of projects that support such zones; these may provide an entry point.
Credible and independent monitoring of the service indicators would be essential, as would be their transparent publication. New technology is increasingly being used by firms in service sectors to increase efficiency, including monitoring the timeliness of service delivery on a real-time basis. For example, India's huge Aadhaar program collects real-time data on individual enrolments that can pinpoint error-prone operators or defective equipment. With some 50,000 enrolment stations, that program has already enrolled over 600 million people.
Technology opens ways to monitor a wide range services, including clearances, approvals, rebates, power supply and transit. 45 A second risk is of severe losses due to inadequate implementation of reforms or overoptimistic projections of service standards. This brings up two problems -limits to government capacity and the span of control of the entity issuing the guarantee. SPGs will lack credibility if issued by governments with clearly inadequate capacity; they are probably not a useful instrument for fragile and conflict-affected states. In addition, the operator of a zone cannot be expected to issue a guarantee covering the performance of a provider -such as a power company--that is totally outside the range its influence, if not control. Either it will be necessary to severely constrain the scope of guarantees or some arrangement will need to be developed to ensure joint responsibility for service delivery. A powerful coordination mechanism or steering group would be needed to bring together key service providers to the zone, possibly under the aegis of the President or another very senior official. Such an arrangement could greatly benefit such projects, which experience shows can be impeded by special interests or lack of cooperation.
These considerations shape the choice of countries for possible SPGs and also their feasible scope, as shown in Figure 4 . The approach is not feasible in countries with poor and unstable governance and little credibility with investors; neither might it be attractive for countries already well established with a broad span of investors. It greatest appeal would be in well-managed countries looking to broaden investments to a wider range of sectors, and in particular to diversify outside the extractive sectors. Examples in Africa could include countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda or Tanzania. The design of the operation also requires the agency issuing the SPG to have a span of control wide enough to manage the insured risks. would the service standards be waived by arbitration. These are serious concerns, because it is possible to imagine conditions under which SPGs do harm rather than good. For example, suppose the agency issuing the guarantee has no authority to improve the performance of the services that it covers and the service standards are set at an overoptimistic level. Firms ill-suited to operating under poor service conditions may enter the zone or they may fail to take risk-mitigation measures. The effect will be loss of productivity, the diversion of aid to firms and a further loss in the credibility of the country as a destination for private investment.
A fourth risk is -will they come? Would the payments offered by SPGs attract firms to sign up in large numbers even if they cannot cover business losses due to poor service? The response will of course reflect the attractiveness of the conditions. But even if not too many firms enroll, some of the purposes of the SPG will be served. The guarantees will force a focus on standards and continuous performance monitoring. Shortfalls which trigger compensation out of the reserve fund supported by the donor will be escalated to high levels of policy dialogue as well as be newsworthy. On their own, SPGs are not a panacea. They cannot substitute for the large investments -in power, transport or other infrastructurethat may be needed to enable service standards to progress to the point where they are sufficiently developed to be included in an SPG. They also cannot substitute for large political risk guarantees that may be useful to attract investors into such projects.
Conclusion
Service Performance Guarantees can be seen as an extension of results-based aid but provide a different pattern of accountability -of a "partnership" of donors and recipient governments towards their investor clients. This is in contrast to conventional resultsbased aid approaches that condition disbursement to governments on the achievement of service outputs or outcomes without a direct link to the clients for the services. For example, even in a results-based education project that disburses against learning outcomes, a child would not be compensated for time devoted to sub-standard education that yields nothing in the form of learning.
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The design of SPGs can draw on a wide range of experience -the ways in which shopping malls and hotels court their clients including through service guarantees (as understood in the service sectors), political risk guarantees, citizen charters and right-to-service movements.
While these are all very different, they offer some lessons that can be used to inform the design of SPGs, either as standalone instruments or, more likely, as components of productivity-related projects and programs that aim to increase private investment. Much more work would, of course, be needed on the detailed design of such instruments before they could become operational. Public light repair Distributor fails to repair a faulty public light within 2 business days of being notified, and customer is the occupier of the immediately neighbouring residence or business $9
APPENDIX A: Service Standards and Compensation Payment Values in UK
All payments made automatically. Values converted from AUD to USD using rates from 26/6/2014. Exceptions -Load shedding -Interruptions caused by a failure of the shared transmission network -Interruptions caused by a failure of transmission connection assets -Interruptions on a day where the unplanned interruption frequency exceeds the threshold set by the regulator -Interruptions that are requested by the customer http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/getattachment/a6b85585-af03-4a2e-bb17-dfff74bbd886/Electricity-DistributionCode-January-2011.pdf
APPENDIX C.1: Victoria Summary Statistics
Victoria is the second most populous state. As of the 2011 Census, Victoria had a population of 5,534,526 (24.8% of all Australia). 46 Victoria consumes 25% of Australia's total energy use (second highest), an increase in 3%
from the previous year. Though we do not have access to sector breakdowns for Victoria, the state has had decreasing 'residential' and 'other' energy uses over the past few years. The three percent increase in overall use was thus driven by other sectors. The majority of household energy in Victoria comes from natural gas (68%), followed by electricity Victoria has one of the more complex and comprehensive GSL standards of Australia, which covers wrongful disconnection, timeliness (regarding connection, appointments, public light reparation and supply restoration), and reliability of supply (unplanned sustained and momentary interruptions). For a more complete price scheme, see Appendix B.5.
There are five electricity distributors in Victoria: Jemena, CitiPower, Powercor, SP AusNet, and United Energy. Each distributor covers a different geographic area of Victoria; contracts go through the intermediary of retailers, of which there are 18. GSL payments are automatically made by the distributors to consumers. In 2010, these payments amounted to more than $6.5 million. (See Appendices C.2 to C.4 for details.) 46 Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2011 Census QuickStats: Victoria. (2011 47 This is the opposite of most of Australia, which overall has an electricity use of 56.7%, and a natural gas use of 37.7%. 
